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business. 14 To seek to sustain the statute, now seven years old, as
emergency legislation against the depression 15 would be to exaggerate
the emergency and overestimate the remedy. 16 It hardly goes to the
root of the difficulty. At all events Lord Hale's phrase,'7 "the worn
touchstone of constitutionality," still serves to "prevent the making of
social experiments * * * in the insulated chambers afforded by the
several states," 18 when an.unsympathetic court judicially reviews the
exercise of legislative discretion.' 9

J. F. D.,

JR.

EQUITY-CONSTRUCTION OF TERM "SALE" IN LEASE AND
BOND.-Plaintiffs deposited stocks and money as collateral security
with the defendant indemnity company which was surety on a bond
given by the plaintiffs to secure the faithful performance of a lease.
The lease and bond contained provisions that if the lessor sold the
leased property the bond should be cancelled, provided the plaintiffs
had faithfully performed up to that time. The lessor died during the
term of the lease, and the property passed under his will to his
children, who formed a corporation of which they were the sole
stockholders and to which they transferred the property, receiving
in return the corporate stock and bonds in equal shares. No money
consideration or price was involved. Plaintiffs had fully performed
up to the time that the property was transferred to the corporation.
"Michigan

Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup.

Ct. 191 (1925) ; Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605

(1926) ; see Producers Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S.
228, 230, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 132 (1920). But see Adler, Business Jurisprudence
(1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. 135, 146 et seq. for a discussion of the historical
impossibility of "privacy" in a business.
" As suggested by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion.
" The statute seems, too, to lack the temporary quality of the approved
emergency statutes. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct.
405 (1924) ; see Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 157, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 460 (1921)
("The regulation is put and justified only as a temporary measure") ; Wilson
v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 345, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 301 (1916).
" See McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 759, for the origin of the phrase and much of its
later history; and Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE
L. J. 1089, 1095, for the manner of its adoption by Mr. Chief Justice Waite
in Munn v. Illinois.
'Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 134 (1921).
"See McClain, The Convenience of the Public Interest Concept (1931)
15 Mim~r. L. REv. 546, 557, suggesting that if, as was said in Wolff Packing
Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, stpra note 2 at 539, 43 Sup. Ct. at 634,
kinds of public interest and degrees of regulation are admissible under the
doctrine, then a finding of some public interest adds little to the solution of the
problem and leaves the particular regulation still to be justified on the general
principles governing exercise of the police power.

RECENT DECISIONS
Plaintiffs sued to recover the collateral security deposited with the
indemnity company on the ground that the transfer by the lessor's
devisees to the corporation formed by them was a "sale" by the lessor.
The indemnity company and the lessor's executors were joined as
defendants. At Special Term judgment was directed for the plaintiffs, cancelling of record the surety bond and directing the return of
the securities. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of the
Special Term and dismissed the complaint. On appeal by the defendant indemnity company which had asked the same relief as the
plaintiffs, held, there had been no "sale" within the meaning of the
provisions of the lease and bond, and the right of the grantee corporation to hold the security for the performance of the surety
remained in force. Halsted v. Globe Indemnity Co., 258 N. Y. 176,
179 N. E. 376 (1932).
Under the lessor's will title passed to his devisees but no "sale"
was made. In passing on whether or not the transfer from the
lessor's devisees to the corporation formed by them was a "sale," the
corporation must be viewed as an entity separate and distinct from
its stockholders as no adequate reason to the contrary appears.' The
leased premises were transferred to a third party, 2 but the words
"sale" and "transfer" are not synonymous. "Sale" is a technical term
which has been defined as the transfer of property from one man to
another in consideration of a sum of money as opposed to barter,
exchange, or gift,3 although in its broadest sense a sale comprehends
any transfer of property from one person to another for a valuable
consideration.4 The intention of the parties must govern and there
is no necessity here for widening the meaning of the term "sale" for
"what the parties obviously intended by the word 'sale' in the lease
and bond, was a transaction whereby the lessor would dispose of the
property for value to a stranger and cease to have any further interest
in it. A transfer to a corporation in which the lessor owns all the
stock is not such a transaction." 5 The transfer to the corporation
was an exchange as distinguished from a sale within the contemplation of the parties. The benefit of a covenant of a surety for the
rent runs with the land, and, in the absence of a stipulation to the
contrary, the grantee who takes subject to a lease obtains the benefit
of the security deposited for the due performance of the lease. 6

0

'Werner v. Hearst, 177 N. Y. 63, 69 N. E. 221 (1903) ; Brock v. Poor, 216
N. Y. 387, 111 N. E. 221 (1915) ; Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84,
155 N. E. 58, 50 A. L. R. 599 (1926); Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N. Y. 319, 172
N. E. 521, 74 A. L. P. 205 (1930).
'-Matter of Gates Estate, 243 N. Y. 193, 153 N. E. 45 (1926); Marr v.
Tumulty, 256 N. Y. 15, 175 N. E. 356 (1931).
Matter of Grand Union Co., 219 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
'Hudson Iron Co. v. Alger, 54 N. Y. 173 (1873).
' Cited with approval in instant case from opinion of McAvoy, J., in the
Appellate Division, 232 App. Div. 576, 251 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1st Dept. 1931).
'Lehman, J., in Mauro v. Alvino, 90 Misc. 328, 152 N. Y. Supp. 963
(1915) cited with approval in Kottler v. New York Bargain House, Inc., 242
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There having been no "sale" of the leased property, the right of the
grantee corporation to hold the security given by the bond has not
terminated and the obligation of the surety remains in force.
T. J. M.

HIGHWAY LAW As AFFECTING COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF

VEHIcLE.-Defendant owner loaned his car to
his nephew for his nephew's personal use. Contrary to the defendant's express instructions the nephew permitted a friend to drive
the defendant's car and, while that friend was driving negligently,
the car collided with a car occupied by the plaintiffs. The nephew
was in the defendant's car at the time of the collision. Held, There
was "negligence in the operation" of the defendant's car committed
by a "person legally using" it with "the permission" of the defendant
so that under §282-e he became liable for damages. Arcara v.
Moresse, 258 N. Y. 211, 179 N. E. 389 (1932).
OWNER OF MOTOR

Section 282-e of the HIGHWAY LAW (now §59 of the VEHICLE
AND TRAFFIC LAW, Consol. Laws c. 71) imposes liability upon the

owner of every motor vehicle "for death or injuries to person or
property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor
vehicle * * * by any person legally using or operating the same with
the permission, express or implied, of such owner." An owner who
loans his car may reasonably restrict the use to which it may be put
and its use for a proscribed purpose is not a use with "the permission" of the owner.' However, if the limiting instructions relate to
the manner of operation rather than to the use of the car, the use is
with "the permission" of the owner, though the limiting instructions
be disobeyed. 2 To bind the owner there must be "negligence in the
operation" of the motor vehicle but the negligent act may be performed "by any person legally using" the motor vehicle, or by any
person "operating the same." Thus the legal user if present in the
car, not having abandoned it or its use but merely having surrendered
the wheel to another, may be guilty of negligence in "operation"
although not "operating" the car in the sense that he is actually
driving it. The common law rule is that in general a bailor is not
liable to third parties injured by the negligence of his bailee with
respect to the article bailed. 3 Prior to the enactment of §282-e an
N. Y. 28, 150 N. E. 591 (1926)

N. E. 478 (1928).

and Rosenfeld v. Aaron, 248 N. Y. 437, 162

'Poota v. Long Island R. R. Co., 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. E. 180,
62 A. L. R. 1163 (1927); Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N. Y. 101, 169 N. E.

103 (1929).

"Grant v. Knepper, 245 N. Y. 158, 156 N. E. 650, 54 A. L. R. 845 (1927).
'Bailments, 6 C. 3. 1151; Negligence, 45 C. J. 849; Motor Vehicles, 42
C. 3. 1078.

